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CHAKRABARTY'S PROGENY:
GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE LAW
E.L. Roy Hunt*
Mark Twain's Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court tells us
that the very first official thing he did in his administration - and
on the very first day of it - was to start a patent office. He knew
that a "country without a patent office and good patent laws was just
a crab, and couldn't travel any way but sideways or backwards."'
Our own nation's founders apparently shared this Connecticut Yankee's view since the Constitution grants Congress the power to proa limited
mote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
2
time to inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries.
In language little changed for almost two hundred years, the implementing Patent Act of 1793 defined statutory subject matter as "any
new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new or useful improvement [thereof]. ' 3 Thomas Jefferson aubelieved
thored that Patent Act and he, like the Connecticut Yankee,
4
that "ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.
The 1952 recodification of the patent laws changed Jefferson's language only to the extent of substituting the word "process" for the
word "art." The accompanying Committee Reports inform us that
matter to "include anything
Congress intended this statutory subject
5
under the sun that is made by man.'

Did Congress really intend that a patent be issued on a living
organism itself, no matter how produced or used? This was the question answered by the United States Supreme Court in 1980. In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,6 a microbiologist filed a patent application relating to his invention of a human-made, genetically-engineered bacterium
capable of breaking down crude oil. The patent examiner denied the
patent on the ground that living things were7 not patentable subject
matter under section 101 of the Patent Code.
*Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law. B.A., 1955, Vanderbilt; J.D., 1960,
University of Mississippi; LL.M., 1962, Yale.
1. M. TWAIN, A CONNECTICUT YANKEE IN KING ARTHUR'S COURT 68 (1889).
2. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)).
4. WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75-76 (Washington ed. 1871).
5. S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952); H.R. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952).
6. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). See generally Seibold, Can Chakrabarty Survive the "Harvard
Mouse?," 2 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POLY 81, 85 n.27 (1988-89) (explaining the facts and holding in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty).
7. Id. at 306.
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To the bare majority of the Court, the simple answer to the question of patentability for living organisms was yes. The drafter of the
majority opinion relied on the most basic tenets of statutory construction. 8 The majority opinion makes one wonder how the patent examiner
and the Patent Office Board of Appeals could have thought otherwise.
The examiner and the Board were not alone, however, in their failure
to answer the question affirmatively. They were joined by four dissenting justices in Chakrabarty.9
While the examiner and the Board justified their negative answer
on the ground that living things are not patentable subject matter,
the dissenting justices viewed the question in the broader context of
this nation's historic commitment to a competitive economy. 0 Patents,
after all, are the ultimate monopoly. The Constitution's authorization
to Congress to grant patent protection represents a judgment that
long-range competitive interests are best served by granting a limited
short-range monopoly. But justices philosophically more attuned to
antitrust laws - which oppose all monopolies - might be expected
to interpret more restrictively the language of the patent law. This
judicial attitude pervaded intellectual property decisions in the Warren
Court, and this same attitude underlies the dissenting opinion in Chakrabarty.
For the lay public, seeking to predict outcomes on the basis of
past decisions and not used to studying the changing makeup of the
Supreme Court, Chakrabarty should have come as a surprise. In two
1970's cases, Gottschalk v. Benson"l in 1972 and Parkerv. Flook 2 in
1978, the Court also was asked to provide monopoly protection by
way of a patent to new technology - in these instances to computer
programs. The Court refused to do so. Importantly, the Court, faced
with complex technical problems, decided to leave to Congress the
issue of whether computer programs should be accorded patent protection. In Parker,the Court said that the judiciary "must proceed cautiously when . . . asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly
1
unforeseen by Congress.' 3
By 1980 and Chakrabarty, the Court's makeup had changed. The
Chakrabarty majority, in the spirit of the Connecticut Yankee and

8. Id. at 318.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 319. Cf. Seibold, supra note 6, at 87 n.42 (1989) (critizing Chakrabartydecision
for creation of potential harm and failure to allow Congress to consider the issues involved).
11. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
12. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
13. Id. at 596.
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Thomas Jefferson, understood that radically new technology was
exactly what the founders and Congress intended the patent system
to encourage and reward.
The importance of Chakrabarty goes far beyond the immediate
result, which was an approval of protection for gene splicing. The
importance of the case goes to judicial attitude - a majority view
that when the statutory criteria of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness are met, a patent should issue in the absence of an explicit order
by Congress that a patent should not issue. As if to emphasize this
new judicial attitude, the following year, a majority of five justices
voted for issuance of a patent which used a computer program to
improve the operation of a rubber-curing process.1 4 In the lower courts,
the post-Chakrabartycases have predictably followed the Court's lead.
Clearly, Chakrabarty narrowed the zone of unpatentability. Since
Chakrabarty, the United States Patent Office has issued over 200
patents for microorganisms. In April 1987, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences upheld the principle of patentability of higher
life forms. The Harvard recombinant mouse patent was the logical
next step. While Congress, at the behest of farmers and other interest
groups may threaten or exterminate Harvard's mouse, the judicial
attitude reborn in Chakrabarty likely will live on.
Some consideration is due a new venue where that judicial attitude
resides - the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
located in Washington. For a variety of reasons unrelated to the issue
in Chakrabarty, Congress created this new court and, significantly
for our purposes, assigned it exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. 15 Thus, it will hear all patent infringement appeals from each
federal district court in the country. It will also hear all appeals from
the Patent Office. A reason given for the court's creation was that it
would provide a single appellate forum in which the judges and their
clerks would be skilled in both law and technology and able to resolve
substantive patent issues.16 Congress also intended the court to eliminate the forum shopping between federal circuits occasioned by the
7
dramatic disparity of results in patent infringement actions.1
Statistics bear out this latter need for a new appellate court. Before
the court was established, patents were held invalid in about sixty
percent to seventy percent of cases decided by all the circuits. Vari14. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
15. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982)).
16. S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 11, 27.
17. Id. at 15.
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ation between circuits in validity determination percentages was
dramatic, with such results as seventy-seven percent invalidity in the
Third Circuit and thirty-eight percent invalidity in the Tenth Circuit. 8
On both counts, Congress' goals for the new court seem to be met.
Since the court's establishment, it has addressed and settled most of
the outstanding substantive issues of patentability, validity, and patent
liability. With respect to validity, the court more often than not,
upholds the validity of patents. The practical and immediate effect for
biotechnology is that the successful patentee is far more likely to have
his or her patent upheld in court.
The 1986 Federal Circuit case of Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal
Antibodies, Inc.19 is representative of this trend toward validation. In
Hybritech, the Federal Circuit reversed in all respects a California
federal district court's holding that all twenty-nine claims of plaintiffs
patent were invalid as anticipated under section 102(g) and obvious
under section 103.20
The Federal Circuit's Chief Judge Howard Markey's view of the
court's role as an activist in the realm of technology is revealed in a
recent speech: "If we are to be free of the applications of perverted
science, we must control technology. We must insure that it remains
the servant of man, not his master. . . . The only means man has to
control technology is the law. "21 And while Chief Judge Markey does
not answer his own rhetorical question, it is perhaps significant that
he then asks: "How far shall we go with genetic engineering?"- Law
for Chief Judge Markey clearly includes court-made law, and his comments suggest that the leader of the court most likely to consider
genetic engineering and other biotechnology cases may attempt to
reinstate a moral criterion for patents similar to that applied to gambling devices during the period 1850-1950.
Should the Federal Circuit move in this direction, it would seem
to place it at odds with the Supreme Court's explicit statement in
Chakrabartythat the Court is without competence to entertain arguments that genetic research may pose serious threat to the human
race.?' The Court emphasizes that such choices are matters of high

18. Mangels, Federal Circuit Court is Spurring a Quiet Revolution in the Field, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 24, 1987, at 24, col. 1.
19. 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
20. Id. at 1368.
21. Markey, Technology, Law and the Courts, 50 ALB. L. REV. 399, 400 (1986) [emphasis
added].
22. Id. at 401.
23. 447 U.S. at 317.
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policy appropriately resolved within the legislative process. The Court
views the process of balancing competing values and interests as the
business of elected representatives. 2
A federal circuit court embarking upon judgments concerning which
applications of science are perverted seems to invite a reminder from
today's Supreme Court that the appropriate judicial attitude in patent
cases is one which encourages "the progress of science and useful
arts." Judgments concerning risks posed by research endeavors such
as genetic engineering should be left to the political branches of government.

24.

Id.

